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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Composition of the Intelligence Advisory Committee

1. The genesis of the Intelligence Advisory Committee was a recommendation of the so-called Lovett Committee, dated 3 November 1945, that a Central Intelligence Agency should be established and that there should be created within the Agency an Intelligence Board which would consist of the G-2, A-2, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, and the chiefs of principal civilian intelligence agencies having functions related to the national security. However, in the President's directive of 22 January 1946, which created the Central Intelligence Group, paragraph 7 provided that the Director of Central Intelligence "shall be advised by an Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of the heads ^(or their representatives) of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies of the Government having functions related to the national security, ^{as determined by the National Intelligence Authority} ~~Here for the first time the distinction~~ was made between the Director in his capacity as head of the Agency and as Director of Central Intelligence with responsibilities wider than the Agency head. The Intelligence Advisory Board was to advise him in this latter capacity.

2. The National Security Act of 1947 was silent as to any advisory body, but there is no indication that this omission had significance one way or another. The then Director proposed to reconstitute the Advisory Group by his own appointment action, but

The "National Intelligence Authority" consists of the Secretary of State, War and Navy, and the President's personal representative.

Ind. 1 NSCID-1 states that the IAC is established "To
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maintain the relationships essential to coordination between
the CIA and the intelligence organizations" (emphasis supplied).

~~not with adamant resistance from the intelligence chiefs who insisted~~ ^{preferred}
that such a Group ~~would have to be~~ constituted by the National Security
Council. This was agreed to and the Intelligence Advisory Committee
was established by NSCID #1 ^{2 December 1947,} to advise the Director of Central
Intelligence.

3. No indication has been found in the records that any consid-
eration was given at that time or later to the thought that one
representative from the Department of Defense might represent all
the military entities involved. In part the military representation
on the Intelligence Advisory Committee was a practical recognition
of the need for close coordination with each service intelligence
group and for close mutual support. However, it also arose in part
out of the second proviso of Section 102(4)(3) of the National
Security Act, which read that the departments and other agencies
of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate,
and disseminate departmental intelligence. This was a clear-cut
expression of congressional intent that the integrity of the
departmental intelligence agencies should be preserved recognized.

4. If now the Secretary of Defense wishes to unify the
departmental intelligence agencies or at least their representation
on the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the above proviso would
raise a question as to whether he were violating the intent of the
Congress. Any objection based on this proviso would be purely
technical and would not withstand a determination made in the
interest of intradepartmental efficiency. A more difficult question

"such departments and
from time
to time exist."

Backwards. Rather: If Sec Def wishes to unify IAC representation,
without unifying the departmental intelligence
agencies, he is off-base. NSCID-1
However, if there becomes one mil. intel dept., then, IAC rep. is logical.

I doubt
the
proviso
means
to include
more
than

is presented if the Central Intelligence Agency were to adopt the position that unified representation would be detrimental to the functioning of the Intelligence Advisory Committee and to the coordination of intelligence activities relating to the national security.

our object is to unify intel (our opinion is that of Dept or to one rep. for 3 agencies (our view of the law NSC 13's)

5. Under sections 102(d)(1) and 102(d)(2) of the National Security Act, this Agency has a duty to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning the intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies and to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities. If, therefore, the Agency believed that possible action ^{to unify mil. intel agencies} by the Secretary of Defense would be detrimental it would have a duty to advise the National Security Council and recommend against such unification. Even if the Agency believed that the unified ^{mil. intel agencies were desirable} representation would be beneficial, it would be necessary to recommend to the National Security Council an appropriate amendment to NSC 13 ^{to provide for unified representation of these unified agencies}.

6. If the service representatives on the Intelligence Advisory Committee are replaced by a single representative from the Department of Defense or in the alternative if the Department of Defense representative is added to the service representation, there would be no change, in our opinion, in the responsibilities and authorities ^{legal} of the Director of Central Intelligence or in his relation to the Intelligence Advisory Committee. There is no question in our mind that Congress holds the Director alone responsible for results

in the field of intelligence related to the national security. Neither he nor the National Security Council can spread this responsibility or establish ^{ive} collective responsibility in any group or committee. It was for this reason that the Intelligence Advisory Committee was properly set up to advise the Director. This limitation on the Committee's power has not been universally accepted and repeated attempts have been made to establish that the Director is merely one among equals in any matter coming before the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Whenever the issue has been clearly joined on this point, however, pre-eminence of the Director has been specifically recognized. The word "pre-eminence" is carefully chosen as the relation of the Director to the other members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee; it is in no sense a command relation. The normal role of authority consistent with responsibility cannot be applied here in simple form. One Director believed clarification necessary to the point of obtaining authority from the National Intelligence Authority to have him act as their Executive Agent in all matters relating to intelligence. He never exercised this authority, and his successor deemed it advisable to establish the relation more nearly in its present form. However, the Director has a right ^{recognized in DISCIB-1} to ₁ request more than simple cooperation, although this is the basis of successful functioning, and in the final analysis to place ~~the~~ ^{any} issue before the National Security Council even in face of the unanimous opposition of the entire Intelligence Advisory Committee whether constituted in its present form or with the unified representation of the Department of Defense. _{para 3,}